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The Limiting Instruciion-Its Effeciiveness and Effeci
She generally gave herself very good advice (though
she very seldom followed it), and [s] ometimes she
scolded herself so severely as to bring tears into her
eyes; and once she remembered trying to box her own
ears for having cheated herself in a game of croquet she
was playing against herself, for this curious child was
fond of pretending to be two people. "But it's no use
now," thought poor Alice, "to pretend to be two people!
Why, there's hardly enough of me left to make one respectable person!"*
As the common law jury evolved from an investigational
institution into its present role as an impartial decision maker,1
problems developed regarding the evidence which the jury was
allowed to consider. Because certain evidence is deemed competent for one purpose and not for another, or competent against
one defendant and not another, limiting instructions are used to
protect both parties to the litigation. 2 When the judge instructs
the jury to consider the evidence only for its legally competent
purpose, the objecting party is theoretically protected from the
specific prejudice which would otherwise require exclusion of
3
the evidence.
Several recent developments have raised grave questions
concerning the willingness of the courts to rely upon limiting
*
LEwis CARROLL, ALIcE's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, 23 (Signet
Classic, 1964).
1. Historically, jurors relied upon knowledge gathered in their

active participation in the fact finding process. See McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE § 223, at 455 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McCORMCK]; 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOmR].

Today, however, they must rely almost exclusively upon evidence presented by the adversaries. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
See generally THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898); 1 WIGMORE § 4(b).

2.

McCoRMIcK at 136; 1 WIGMORE at 30.

3. This practice probably arose out of necessity. The only feasible
alternative to unlimited use or total exclusion of the evidence is a procedure whereby only the competent element of evidence could be considered by a jury. See Shephard v. United States, 62 F.2d 683 (10th Cir.
1933); 1 WIGMORE at 300.

Although many courts have recognized that

the limiting instruction is a "naive assumption," the fear remained that
it was part of a system resting at homeostasis and the slightest interference with this balance would be more detrimental than beneficial.
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948); Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641, 646 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

LIMITING INSTRUCTION
instructions. This Note will consider whether the jury actually
follows the court's admonitions. It will then focus on the questions arising in three specific areas: the use of the limiting instruction in joint trials to limit the jury's consideration of hearsay evidence; the use of limiting instructions to limit the jury's
consideration of "other crimes" evidence; and the general use of
limiting instructions where no alternatives are available to pro4
tect defendants.
I. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITING
INSTRUCTION
The greatest obstacle to an understanding of the operation
of the jury is the traditional secrecy enveloping the jury's decision reaching process.5 Logically, the most efficient method of
testing the jury's ability to disregard evidence for a particular
purpose or against a particular defendant, would be to record
their deliberations. However, this procedure is clearly prohibited, at least in the federal courts.6 The result is the absence of
first hand empirical evidence upon which to base any conclusion as to the ability of the jury to follow instructions limiting
the use of evidence. There have been several attempts to
study the jury by the use of questionnaires and experimental
juries. Although any conclusion based on information so gathered may be subject to statistical insufficiencies, the results of
valuable insight into the jury's use of
several studies provide
7
limiting instructions.
The University of Chicago Jury Project utilized experimental
juries, intensive jury interviews, and interpretation and analysis
4. This Note will concentrate on the criminal trial only, although
limiting instructions are also used to prevent prejudice in civil cases.
For the role of the limiting instruction in a civil case, see Tipton v.
Socony Mobil Oil, Inc., 375 U.S. 34 (1963).
5. See generally AuERBAcH, GAmasoN, HURST & MAERmI, TnE LsGAL
PROCESS 280 (1961).

6. Id. at 281. Although the consent of all necessary persons was
obtained, one study met with stern opposition and was subsequently
prohibited by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1964).
It should be noted that this study was widely supported by many
legal scholars. AuERBAcH, GARRISON, HURsT & MERMN, op. cit. supra
note 5. In addition, the legislation pertains only to federal juries,
leaving the door open for this type of research in state courts. It
would seem that the knowledge gained from a well supervised study
of jury deliberations would profit the law much more than it would
undermine the jury function. This is especially true since, if the instructions are ineffective defendants are subject to undue prejudice.
7. See generally Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project,

38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959).
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of statistical data to test several hypotheses in an attempt to
uncover many of the mysteries of the jury system. One hypothesis dealt with the ability of the juror to follow curative
instructions. 9 In a personal injury action to recover damages
from an automobile accident, the following variables were presented to an experimental jury: (1) Defendant disclosed that
he had no liability insurance and no objection was made by
plaintiff: the average verdict for the plaintiff was $33,000; (2)
Defendant disclosed his liability insurance and there was no
objection: the average verdict totaled $37,000; (3) Defendant
disclosed that he had insurance and an objection was taken by
the plaintiff. The judge then instructed the jury to disregard
the evidence. The average verdict was $46,000.10
The conclusion drawn from an analysis of recorded deliberations and subsequent interviews of jurors was that an instruction to disregard, instead of preventing the jurors from
considering the insurance, sensitized the jury to that evidence."
However, it was also concluded that the instruction to disregard
did serve to prevent the jurors from talking about insurance
during the deliberation. 12 This, however, is little consolation to
the defendant when the instruction is ineffective in limiting
the verdict.
A similar study, yet smaller and less sophisticated, consisted
of a questionnaire examination of jurors subsequent to their
participation in actual civil litigation.13 One question to be answered was whether "the jury ignored instructions by the judge
to disregard statement [s] previously made."' 14 The most significant fact adduced was that, of eighteen persons interviewed,
only one remembered the judge's instruction sufficiently to
attempt to follow it. 15 The authors concluded that their study
demonstrated the "wisdom of trial lawyers who fight hard to
get a particular piece of evidence before the jury, even though
they know the judge is going to strike it out."'16
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ibid.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
Ibid.
12. Ibid. Compare Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 Onxo ST. L.J.
1, 15 (1936), in which this same phenomenon was noted. Yet there the
result was deemed to be due to the unfamiliarity of the jurors with
automobile insurance, a situation which would be very rare today.
13. Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. REv. 235 (1952).
14. Id. at 243.
15. Id. at 245.
16. Ibid.
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Actually the above studies dealt with what might be called
curative rather than limiting instructions. The curative instruction functions as an alternative to the granting of a new trial
whenever inadmissible evidence is heard by the jury. It is presumed that, as a result of the judge's admonition, the jury will
completely disregard the incompetent evidence. The limiting
instruction functions somewhat differently in that the jury
hears and considers evidence, but is charged to limit consideration of it to its competent use. The function required of the
jury in implementing the limiting instruction is probably more
difficult. Rather than entirely disregarding the evidence, the
juror must ultimately consider it but only for a limited purpose.17 Consequently, the above studies, by casting doubt on the
ability of the jury to follow curative instructions, seriously
question the jury's ability to implement the limiting instruction.
Although the available empirical evidence deserves consideration in reaching any conclusion concerning the validity of
the limiting instruction, such information should be considered
mainly as complementary to the experience of many learned
jurists and scholars who entertain no doubt that limiting instructions are useless. 8 Their conclusion is based upon the
premise that it is impossible for the juror to so order his mind
as to enable him to fractionate evidence into competent and incompetent segments, using only the former in his decision making process.
Although few dispute this position, most argument to the
contrary emphasizes that limiting instructions are one of the
expressions of trust that American jurisprudence places in the
jury system. Thus, in Delli Paoli v. United States, 9 Justice
Burton, speaking for the majority, concluded the following with
respect to the limiting instruction:
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the
law to the jury and that the jury applies that law"to the facts
17. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
18. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 623
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Delli Paoli v. United States,
229 F.2d 319, 321, 323 (2d Cir. 1956) (L. Hand, J.) (Frank, J., dissenting);

Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.); People
v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.); People v.
Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E. 336 (1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting); 9
WIGMORE

19.

§ 2550.

352 U.S. 232 (1957).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:264

as the jury finds them. Unless we proceed on the basis that the

jury will follow the
court's instructions . . . the jury system
20
makes little sense.
However, it would seem that this fear is misplaced and may even
work contrary to the interest of reinforcing the security of the
jury system. The limiting instruction has been characterized
as a judicial "placebo" 2' 1 which "undermines a moral relationship
between the courts, the jurors, and the public; [and] like any
other judicial deception, it damages the decent judicial administration of justice. '22 Accordingly, there is no reason why taking
from the jury a function which it cannot perform would interfere
with the many functions which society and the law consider
best left with the jury.23 On the contrary, any step away from
the rigid presumptions and prophylactic fictions which have
haunted the criminal and civil courts in the past centuries should
be hailed as a legal victory.
The strongest argument in support of the limiting instruction recognizes it as an empty ritual but suggests that there are
mitigating policies which support its use. Judge Learned Hand
took this position in Nash v. United States24 when he recognized
that, although the limiting instruction would not prevent the
jury from considering the prejudicial evidence, 25 by permitting
the avoidance of the exclusionary rules of evidence it "probably
26
furthers rather than impedes the search for truth."
Both of the arguments supporting the use of limiting instructions seem to beg the question, for the issue to be decided is
whether the jury is able to perform this very important function
of limiting its consideration of evidence. The security of the
jury system as an institution and the competency of the evidence
20. Id. at 242.
21. In a criticism of the majority decision in Delli Paoli, Judge
Frank stressed the reference by Judge Hand to the limiting instruction
as a "placebo." He took the medical definition, "a medicinal lie," and
compared it to its legal equivalent, "a judicial lie." United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956).
22. United States v. Grunewald, supra note 21, at 574. It has been
said that the use of limiting instructions fosters an inconsistent attitude
toward juries for "treating them at times as a group of low-grade morons
and at other times as men endowed with a superhuman ability to control
their emotions and intellects." MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 105 (1956).
23. See generally KALVEN & ZEISL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
24. 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932).
25. He referred to the limiting instruction as a "mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only their [the jury's] powers, but anybody's [sic]
else." Id. at 1007.
26. Ibid.
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are tangential issues to be independently evaluated upon the
finding that limiting instructions are of no value.
II.

THE JOINT TRIAL-ADMISSION OF HEARSAY
EVIDENCE

In the joint criminal trial, the limiting instruction is commonly relied upon to support the admission into evidence of con27
fessions and other implicating statements of a codefendant.
This evidence is hearsay since it is an out of court statement
admitted to prove the truth of the confession; 28 therefore, it is
admissible only against the party making the statement.2 9
Recent decisions of federal and state courts have cast serious
doubt upon the fairness of this procedure. Indeed, reliance upon
limiting instructions to cure the hearsay element of a codefendant's confessions and admissions may constitute a violation of
the accused's sixth amendment right of confrontation by depriving him of the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.

A. RESTRICTIONS UPON THE USE OF THE LnmTiNG INSTRUCTION
At common law, 30 and under most statutory codes of procedure,3 1 it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether defendants jointly charged with the commission of a crime will be tried together or separately. 32 Although there are several grounds upon which a defendant
might move for a severance, 33 the most common, and the only
ground discussed in this paper, is where a codefendant has made
statement which
a confession, admission, or other extrajudicial
34
implicates the party moving for the severance.
Since the witnesses and evidence against each defendant
will generally be the same, efficient judicial administration is
LEE

27. Deli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), 22 WASH. &
L. REV. 285 (1965).
28. McCoRMICK at 460.

29. It is considered to be an admission against interest by the
See 5 WIGmoRE §§ 1463-65; Morgan, Declarations Against
Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451 (1952).
30. State v. Sederstrom, 99 Minn. 234, 109 N.W. 113 (1906); State
v. Davis, 13 Mont. 384, 34 Pac. 182 (1893). See generally Annot., 70
declarant.

A.L.R. 1172 (1931).
31. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 830, 867 (1957).

32. Id. at 832.
33. Ibid.
34. The same analysis will apply in any situation where evidence
is admissible against one defendant and not another.
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promoted by the joint trial.3 5 However, the possible increase in
the administrative burden is clearly insufficient to justify reliance on ineffective limiting instructions to prevent prejudice.
The Supreme Court has in several instances recognized that
considerations of administrative convenience must be subordinated to a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.30 Therefore, if it is recognized that the limiting instruction does not perform its expected function, the administrative considerations
calling for joinder of criminal defendants would seem insufficient justification for endangering the defendant's right to a
fair trial.
A recurrent area in which the jury's capacity to follow limiting instructions is questioned is the joint prosecution for conspiracy. Extrajudicial incriminatory statements of one conspirator, not within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay
rule,37 are generally admitted against the declarant, subject to
an instruction limiting their use to the declarant. In Delli Paoli
v. United States, the Supreme Court re-examined and reaffirmed
the general propriety of this practice.38 The Court noted its
many prior decisions which, although recognizing the heavy burden placed on jurors by the limiting instruction, nevertheless
upheld its use. 39 However, the Court further recognized that
not every instruction is effective, the applicable test being
"whether the instructions were sufficiently clear and whether it
was reasonably possible for the jury to follow them. '40 The
trial court in Delli Paoli had delineated in its instructions the
reasons why the jury should consider the confession only against
35.

See People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265 (1965).

36. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1946); Schaffer
v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
37. Generally the coconspiracy exception to the hearsay rule applies to acts or declarations by one coconspirator committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its pendency, providing that a foundation for its admission is laid by independent proof of the conspiracy.
See 72 HAv. L. REV. 920, 984-85 (1959). See generally Levie, Hearsay
and Conspiracy, A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators'Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 52 MIcn. L. REV. 1159 (1954). However, out of court
confessions, since they occur either after the conspiracy has ended or
after the confessor's withdrawal, do not fall within this exception. See
72 HARv. L, REV. 920, 989-90 (1959).
38. 352 U.S. 232 (1957); see 24 U. Car. L. REV. 710 (1957).
39. In a footnote the court stated:
For long-standing recognition that possible prejudice against
other defendants may be overcome by clear instructions limiting
the jury's consideration of a post-conspiracy declaration solely
to the determination of the guilt of the declarant, see also ....
352 U.S. at 239 n.5 (1957).
40. Id. at 239.
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its maker. The Supreme Court noted that "nothing could have
been more clear" 41 than these instructions. In addition, the
Court felt that, since the incriminating confession was admitted
only after all the government's evidence had been presented, it
42
was reasonably possible for the jury to follow the instructions.
However, the limited language of Delli Paoli, as well as subsequent decisions, have cast doubt on the vitality of the decision
as broadly supporting the use of the limiting instruction. The
Court engaged in a careful factual analysis to demonstrate why
the jury was able to limit its consideration of the implicating
confession. 43 By negative implication, when some or all of these
factors are not present, the Court might well find that the
44
prejudice was not eliminated. Justice Frankfurter dissented,
stating his disbelief in the efficacy of the limiting instruction:
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against
misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of
the jurors. The admonition ...

fails of its purpose as a legal

protection to defendants against whom such a declaration should
not tell.45

Even more suggestive of the demise of the limiting instruc46
tion is the recent Supreme Court decision in Jackson v. Denno.
In a five to four decision, New York's procedure for determining
the voluntariness of confessions was struck down as a violation
of due process. In holding that a jury could not separate the
issue of voluntariness from that of truth,47 the Court seemed to
41. Id. at 240-41 n.6.
42. Other factors considered important by the Court were the simple nature of the crime, the fact that the separate interests of the parties
were emphasized throughout the trial, and that the confession was
merely corroborative of other evidence already established by the government. Id. at 241-42. See also United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1966).
43. Most of the Court's analysis seemed to be aimed at demonstrating that there was no confusion among the jurors and therefore no
tendency to convict by association, a problem faced by the Court in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
44. Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan joined with Justice
Frankfurter in dissenting.
45. 352 U.S. at 247 (1957).
46. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
47. Under the New York procedure the jury heard the confession,
determined its voluntariness, and judged its truth or falsity. If the jury
found the confession involuntary, it was instructed to disregard it. The
Court felt no juror could do this. 378 U.S. at 388. In a footnote the
Court quoted the following passage:
mTthe rule of exclusion ought not to be emasculated by admitting the evidence and giving to the jury an instruction which,
as every judge and lawyer knows, cannot be obeyed.
Id. at 382-83. See MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLOAMERIcAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 104-05 (1956).
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feel that a juror could probably understand that an involuntary
confession could well be unreliable; however, he could not be
expected to comprehend the underlying motivation requiring the
complete exclusion of such evidence-the belief that important
human values are sacrificed when the government, in the course
of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of the accused
against his will.48 Thus the limiting instruction alone could
not prevent the jury from considering the impermissible evidence.
Although the precise functions required of the juror in
Jackson are not that required of the juror in Delli Paoli, the
essential mental process required-the limited use of probative
evidence-is equivalent. Moreover, it has been suggested that
the task to be performed in limiting consideration of hearsay
evidence in a joint trial might be even more difficult. In People
v. Aranda,49 Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court stated:
the jury was only required
Under the New York procedure .
In
to disregard a confession it found to be involuntary ....
joint trials, however, when the admissible confession of one defendant inculpates another defendant, the confession is never
deleted from the case and the jury is expected to perform the
overwhelming task of considering it in determining the guilt or
innocence of the declarant and then ignoring it in determining
the guilt or innocence of any codefendants of the declarant. 50
If Justice Traynor is correct, the Supreme Court may no longer
be willing to recognize the propriety of limiting instructions to
prevent prejudicial evidence from reaching the jury."'
Several other federal and state courts have doubted the
efficacy of the limiting instruction enough to prohibit reliance
upon it in joint trials. The Fifth Circuit has several times expressed its dissatisfaction with limiting instructions.52 In Barton
v. United States,53 defendants were charged with violating the
48. 378 U.S. at 382. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07
(1960); see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
49. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265 (1965).
50. Id. at 529, 407 P.2d at 271-72.
51. See 19 VAxD. L. REv. 951 (1966).
52. In Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955), the
court reversed defendant's conviction for intentionally and unlawfully
receiving stolen government property. The trial court denied a motion
for severance under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This was held to be an abuse of discretion in that under the circumstances the limiting instruction was ineffective to protect the moving
defendant from the incriminating confession of the codefendant. However, the court, as in Deli Paoli,was primarily concerned with the facts
of the particular case and did not lay down a blanket rule.
53. 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959).
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Mann Act. Prior to trial, one defendant moved for severance,
presenting to the lower court the implicating confession given
by his codefendant. The court denied the motion, and at trial
the statement was read to the jury, with instructions to consider
it only against the codefendant. 54 On appeal, the court reversed, holding that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
not to grant the severance. In acknowledging the ineffectiveness
of the instruction the court stated that:
The sole reliance for Mitchell's protection was the [trial] court's
instruction to the jury ....

[W]e doubt whether it was at all

possible to carry out that instruction. To do so certainly would
require twelve minds more perfectly disciplined than those of
the average human jurors. 55
Although the court refrained from enunciating a broad rule,
its language with respect to the ineffectiveness of the limiting
instruction would strongly suggest an attitude requiring severance or an effective editing of the statement, 56 for any other
alternative would require reliance on the instruction to prevent
misuse of the hearsay evidence.
The most recent federal court to consider this question found
the limiting instruction insufficient to safeguard the defendant's right not to have the jury exposed to prejudicial hearsay
evidence. In United States v. Bozza,57 six defendants were convicted of various crimes related to the burglary of United States
post offices. At trial the confession of codefendant Jones was
admitted over timely motions for severance. Limiting instructions were given and the names of the objecting defendants
omitted. The court of appeals reversed the convictions of all
defendants except Jones, holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in not requiring the government to choose between
severance and exclusion of the confession.58 The court clearly
rested its decision on the inadequacy of the limiting instruction,
noting that:
It is impossible realistically to suppose that when the twelve
good men and women had Jones' confession in the privacy of
the jury room, not one yielded to the nigh irresistable temptation to fill in the blanks... and ask himself... to what extent
54. The relevant part of the instruction read as follows: "If two
men are engaged in a transaction and one of them makes a confession,
it is admissible against him, and not against the other fellow." Id. at
897.
55. Id. at 898.
56. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
57. 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).

58. Id. at 218.
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However, it was not willing to end all such reliance on the limiting instruction and while acknowledging the "logic of Jackson v. Denno"60 the court stated:
[W] e do not mean to cast general doubt on the value of instructions to disregard or limit evidence ... we hold only that there
is a point where credulity as to the efficacy of such instructions
with respect to a confession implicating co-defendants is overstrained, and this point was reached here.61

Thus, the Second Circuit adopted a position similar to Barton
but distinguishable in that, when excision cannot effectively cure
prejudice, the court will examine the circumstances of each
case G2 to determine whether the jury could follow the judge's
limiting instruction. Under Barton, it is arguable that, once it
be a severance,
is shown that excision is ineffective, there must
6 3
the circumstances of each case notwithstanding.
A somewhat weaker position was taken by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Kramer v. United States,64 where it was
held that "when deletion of the hearsay . ..

is feasible .

.

. an

instruction by the court that the jury disregard the reference is not an adequate substitution for deletion." 65 However,
the court would not go so far as to require severance where
deletion was impossible and thereby did not completely repudiate the validity of the limiting instruction. 6
59. Id. at 215.
60. Id. at 217.
61. Ibid.
62. The court, in an extensive discussion, applied the criteria set
down by the Supreme Court in Delli Paoli to determine whether, "under
the circumstances," the instructions could be implemented.
63. The Barton court displayed no trust whatsoever in the limiting
instruction and thus any reliance on it would be inconsistent with its
position. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
64. 317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see Oliver v. United States,
335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Greenwell v. United States, 336
F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
65. 317 F.2d at 117.
66. In a similar case, Oliver v. United States, 335 F.2d 724 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), four defendants were charged with rape. One of the codefendants confessed, implicating the other three, and his statement was
admitted into evidence with limiting instructions to use it only against
the confessor. Despite substantial independent evidence of guilt, the
court of appeals reversed the convictions of all defendants except the
confessor. The court felt it "could not be 'sure' . . . that the hearsay
references [in the confession] . . . did not sway the jury." Furthermore,
"unlike the confession in Delli Paoli v. U.S., . . . there was no 'imprac-

ticality of such deletion.'" 335 F.2d at 728. See the concurring opinion
of Wright, J., where he notes the uselessness of the limiting instruction.
335 F.2d at 731. See also Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C.
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The most logical position was that taken by Judge Frank
in his dissenting opinion to Delli Paoli.67

Reasoning that limit-

ing instructions were fully ineffective, 6 he suggested the following rule:
Where several defendants are on trial ...

if the government

seeks to put in evidence an out-of-court statement by one defendant which is hearsay as to the others ...

(a)

tively deleted

(b)

then

Unless all references to the other defendants can be effec.

.

and unless those references are deleted,

the trial judge must
(1) refuse to admit the statement or
(2) sever the trial of those other defendants. 69

This standard reflects the logical consequence of the conclusion
that limiting instructions are ineffective, and by requiring "effective" deletion, leaves a modicum of discretion in the trial
court to determine the feasibility of a method other than severance.70
Several state courts 71 also have rejected the limiting instruction as a device to protect the codefendant in a joint trial,
Cir. 1964), where the defendants were charged with bank robbery. One
defendant confessed implicating appellant Greenwell. At trial, his name
was deleted from the confession and the phrase, "named person," inserted as a substitute. However, with only the two men on trial and
both at the same time, it was held that this was not an effective way
of keeping the incriminating information from the jury. This reasoning may demonstrate the willingness of this court to adopt the Fifth
Circuit procedure of requiring a severance any time the prejudicial
evidence cannot be effectively eliminated by excision or substitution.
Several circuits have refused to recognize the inability of limiting instructions to protect codefendants. See Glass v. United States, 351 F.2d
678 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Gardner, 347 F.2d 405 (7th Cir.
1965).
67. 229 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1956).
68. Id. at 324.
69. 229 F.2d at 324. (Emphasis added.)
70. See Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
where the court discusses the effectiveness of editing.
71. See People v. Buckminster, 274 ll. 435, 113 N.E. 713 (1916);
State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949). See also State
v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 101 AUt. 476 (1917). New York has adopted a
position similar to the D.C. Circuit in requiring deletion whenever possible. People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y.2d 360, 206 N.E.2d 864 (1965).
Kentucky has adopted a somewhat different rule, requiring "some additional factor" of prejudice before a severance would be granted. One
such factor was if "one defendant's admission directly implicates the
other." Underwood v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1965).
Several states, however, have- recently reaffirmed their confidence
in the limiting instruction to prevent prejudice in joint trials. See State
v. Goodyear, 404 P.2d 397 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Egerton, 141 S.E.2d 515
(N.C. 1965).
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California7 2 and New Jersey 73 having recently adopted Judge
Frank's suggestion.
The most recent development affecting the prosecution of
joint trials was the Supreme Court's adoption of an amendment
to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule
provides for vesting the trial court with discretion in the granting
or denial of severance. 74 The amendment added that:
In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court
may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the
court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions
made by the defendants which75 the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
This amendment does not require excision or severance as an

alternative to reliance upon limiting instructions. However, it
certainly reflects a distrust of using the limiting instruction
to prevent prejudice. 76 By having access to prejudicial state72. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265 (1965).
73. State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965). This most
recent state court decision abolishing reliance on limiting instructions
stated:
Not only is there a grave question as to the efficacy of this type
of instruction in guiding the jury's deliberations, but, wherever
there is a potentiality for prejudice in a criminal trial, our courts
should take all reasonable measures to protect those defendants
whose rights are endangered.
Id. at 157, 215 A.2d at 355.
The court went on to prospectively adopt the rule suggested by
Judge Frank, and adopted in Aranda, requiring severance if other methods of protecting the defendant fail. See text accompanying note 69

supra.

74. If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment
or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court
may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice
requires.
FED. R. CRin. P. 14.
75. The amendment, added at the end of Rule 14, supra note 74,
was passed Feb. 26, 1966 and became effective July 1, 1966.
76. See Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
54 GEO. L.J. 1276, 1285 n.32 (1966).
It could be argued that the Supreme Court's recent amendment of
Rule 14, by leaving the trial court with discretion as to severance, impliedly recognized the constitutionality of Rule 14 insofar as it would
permit limiting instructions to be relied upon to cure prejudice from
hearsay evidence. This argument would seem to be directly contrary
to what the Court intended by adopting this amendment. By providing
the trial court with an effective tool to require submission of questionable evidence, the Court might well have been requiring an effective
editing of these hearsay statements prior to their admission. This would
greatly reduce the number of cases in which the only alternative to
limiting instructions is severance, and would mitigate the threat of
imposing an administrative burden on the courts.
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ments, the trial court can predetermine the possible prejudice
to the defendant at a time when severance or excision is a far
77
more practical alternative.
By its decision in Jackson v. Denno, and approval of the
amendment to Rule 14, the Supreme Court may have signaled
the demise of the rule in Delli Paoli. Accordingly, in the future, the Court may examine more closely the discretion exercised by federal courts in relying upon limiting instructions.
However, the recognition by the Supreme Court that limiting
instructions are ineffective may also have repercussions in the
state courts because of the foreseeable constitutional implications.

B.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LIMITING INSTRUCTION

In Pointer v. Texas,78 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
constitutional right under the sixth amendment, as applied to
the states through the fourteenth, of a defendant to cross-examine his accusers. If limiting instructions are ineffective in
preventing hearsay evidence from being considered by the jury,
the accused is deprived of his right of cross-examination and
consequently of his constitutional rights under the sixth amendment.
Although there is no explicit provision in the Constitution
guaranteeing the accused the right to cross-examination, the
sixth amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
77. Ibid.
78. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In Pointer, the accused was not represented by counsel and did not attempt to cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the preliminary hearing. Since the victim was unavailable for the trial, the transcript of the hearing which contained his
testimony was introduced into evidence.

Defendant challenged this

evidence on the ground that it was an infringement of his sixth amendment right of cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that "[T]he
right of ... cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal. . .

."

Id. at 405. And, furthermore, that "the Sixth Amendment's

right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 403.
Prior to Pointer, it had been held that there was not a federally
guaranteed right of cross-examination. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953).
However, the Stein Court probably was wrong, for in
Pointer the Supreme Court stated: "Indeed, we have expressly declared
that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him is a denial of. . . due process of law." 380 U.S. at 405. Two
cases support this position. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . 9 The history of this amendment is
silent as to its precise meaning; however, the courts have
agreed that it guarantees the defendant the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him.80 Because the
hearsay rule and the right to confrontation contain as a common
denominator the right of cross-examination, 8' the constitutional
requirements of the confrontation clause have generally been
couched in terms of the hearsay rule and the exceptions thereto.
Thus, the courts have generally held that the right to confrontation is not violated by hearsay evidence which is admissible under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.8 2 Professor Wigmore, in noting this relationship, concluded that "The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the Hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found,
developed, or created therein.

'' 3
,

Relying upon similar reasoning, the Court also struck down a
practice used of entering into evidence the confession of a codefendant. In Douglas v. Alabama8 4 the prosecutor, under the
guise of cross-examination of a hostile witness, was allowed to
present to the jury the confession of a convicted accomplice.
Petitioner was unable to cross-examine the accomplice because
of his refusal to testify and,8 5 since the prosecutor was not a
79. U.S. CONST. amend. V.I.
80. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Gaines v.
Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 85 (1928).
81. The main objection to hearsay evidence lies in the inability of
the defendant to cross-examine the witnesses against him. McCoR1icIK
at 458; 5 WIGMORE § 1362; Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules

of Evidence, 4 U. CHi. L. REv. 247 (1937).

Other infirmities include the

inability of the jury to observe the demeanor of the declarant, Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1894); People v. Sligh, 48 Mich. 54
(1882); McComvIcK at 458; 5 WIGMORE § 1395, the fact that the declarant
is not under oath, and the possibility that the evidence was not repeated
in substance as it was related to the witness. McCoRmicK at 458.
82. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1894); Note,

Preserving the Right to Confrontation--A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1965).
83. 5 WIGmORE § 1397. Authority exists holding that the right to
confrontation is a common law right, the purpose of the sixth amendment being to preserve but not to expand it. Sallinger v. United States,
272 U.S. 542 (1926). See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1894). Compare the language of Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934), where he concluded that "the exceptions
[to the hearsay rule] are not even static, but may be enlarged from
time to time if there is no material departure from the reason of the
general rule."
84. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
85. The accomplice refused to testify on the ground that his case
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witness, he could not be cross-examined. The Court concluded
that "petitioner's inability to cross-examine [the accomplice] as
to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of crossexamination secured by the Confrontation Clause."8 6
In a joint trial, implicating statements of a codefendant are
87
admitted, not under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule,
was on appeal and the fifth amendment still applied. However, this
contention was not answered by the Court. 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965).
86.

Id. at 419.

The Supreme Court's concern with the importance of cross-examination is emphasized in Pointer by its extensive discussion of this right
and its citation to Wigmore, where that writer stressed the need for
cross-examination in the following terms:
It [cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth ....

[T]here

has probably never been a moment's doubt upon this point in
the mind of a lawyer of experience.
5 WIGMORE § 1367.
87. Pointer and Douglas may have created a situation wherein
almost every exception to the hearsay rule, because it deprives the accused of his opportunity to cross-examine, is subject to a federal standard

requiring the right to cross-examine except where the Constitution

dispenses with it. See Note, Preserving the Right to ConfrontationA New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 741 (1965).

Exceptions to the hearsay rule were created to allow use of evidence
which is unusually trustworthy and necessary. 5 WiGMoRE §§ 1420-22.
However, in applying these criteria, the several factors underlying the
need for cross-examination also should be weighed: the need to test the
witness's honesty, memory, perception, and ability to communicate. In
weighing the above considerations, the judge in a criminal case must
distinguish between the countervailing policies at work in criminal as
opposed to civil litigation. See Fillman, Inadmissible Hearsay as Evidence To Impeach a Witness Other Than the Declarant,57 Nw. U.L. REv.
499, 503 (1962). The modern trend is toward the admission of more
probative evidence, despite its hearsay qualities. UmNFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 7. However, this liberality must stop at the border of the criminal
trial where the consequences transcend financial loss. A system of law
geared to protecting the innocent must restrict rather than expand the
admission of doubtful evidence. Some hearsay evidence will and should
be admitted, the problem being to devise a standard that will protect
the defendant from undue prejudice and, yet, admit much needed probative evidence. The courts would not and probably should not dispose
of trustworthiness and necessity as criteria in creating a constitutional
standard. However, in view of the critical nature of a criminal trial, it
would seem that many of the historical judgments of the common law
courts weighing these two factors should not be accepted at face value.
Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 748 (1965).
Philosophical underpinnings and experiences of people change without
a simultaneous change in the law. For example, the basis for the dying
declaration exception-trustworthiness-may no longer be sound because
the theological basis of this rule may no longer be valid. See id. at 749.
Yet the admissibility of statements against interest is probably not af-
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but under the assumption that the hearsay element will be
cured by the limiting instruction. However, considering the
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson, and the other movements
away from such reliance, it seems that this assumption has been
or expressly will be rejected by the Supreme Court. The result
is that reliance upon limiting instructions will be equivalent to
the naked admission of hearsay evidence and a consequential
deprivation of the ac6used's right to cross-examination.,,
The proper solution to this problem is that suggested by
Judge Frank,89 that where incriminating statements are to be
introduced into a joint trial, either a severance must be granted,
the confession must not be used, or the hearsay objection must
be cured by an effective editing of the evidence. Unlike Bozza,
under no circumstances should it be assumed that twelve jurors
could otherwise properly examine this kind of evidence. This is
especially so when it is recognized that the right to cross-examine one's accusers is fundamental and when feasible alternatives are available which would eliminate all prejudice with little
or no burden to the state. Indeed, more judicial time may be
fected by the passage of time.
One federal court has articulated what may become the required
analysis when the defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence he
was unable to cross-examine:
[Tihe Sixth Amendment . . , [cannot] be said to have incorporated the rule against hearsay evidence, as" understood at the
. [It was not intended] to serve as
time of ...
[its] adoption.
a rigid and inflexible barrier against the orderly development of
reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay rule....
Congress and . . . a state legislature ... may carve out a new
without violating constitutional rights, where
exception ...
there is reasonable necessity for it and where it is supported by
an adequate basis for assurance that the evidence has those
qualities of reliability and trustworthiness .
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958).
This analysis may well be applied to questions arising in the state and
federal courts involving the hearsay requirements of the confrontation
clause with respect to cross-examination. The result will probably be
a case by case inquiry into the traditional factors creating exceptions.
But the frailities of the jury and the problems stemming from hearsay
evidence should always be emphasized.' This is especially true when
the evidence is crucial to the ultimate issue of guilt, with the presumption of innocence weighing heavily on the trial court's admission of
hearsay evidence.
88. See Barton v. United States, where the court stated:
Unless that admonition [the limiting instruction] was effective
...Mitchell has been deprived of his constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, for he has been afforded no opportunity to cross-examine Barton as to the truthfulness of his many accusatory statements.
263 F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1959).
89. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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saved by severance, for it would make unnecessary the many
appeals alleging error in discretion and requiring the various appellate courts to apply the nebulous criteria established by the
90
Court in Delli Paoli.
III. LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS-OTHER CRIMES'
EVIDENCE
As with the joint trial, the admissibility of evidence of a
defendant's previous crimes under a limiting instruction provides
only a transparent shield against prejudice. Since the highly
prejudicial effect of such evidence is recognized, it is admissible
only for limited purposes. Generally, evidence of prior convictions may not be admitted solely to prove that the accused has
a criminal disposition or is of bad character, 91 for such evidence
unduly prejudices the jury against the accused. This prejudice
stems from two sources. The first is the tendency of jurors to
brand the accused as an incorrigible who, even if not guilty of
the particular crime with which he is charged, should be punished for the other crimes which he has committed. 2 Second is
the logical tendency to infer that because the accused has committed other crimes, he probably committed the one with which
he is charged. In Michelson v. United States,93 the Supreme
Court noted that such evidence must be excluded because of the
90. See note 42 supra. One other approach could be taken in arguing the unconstitutionality of the joint trial where limiting instructions
are relied upon to prevent prejudice. In United States v. Stein, 140
F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), the district court concluded that "an
application for a severance is, in effect, an invocation of the right to a
trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Several courts have held that an impartial jury "is one which is of impartial
frame of mind at the beginning of trial, is influenced only by legal and
competent evidence during trial, and bases its verdict upon evidence
connecting the defendant with the crime charged .... ." See note 118
infra. Since both the sixth and fourteenth amendments pose objections
to uncross-examined evidence, such incriminating statements are con-

stitutionally incompetent. Therefore, it could be argued that admission
of hearsay statements violates the sixth amendment guarantee to an
impartial jury.
91. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1964); McCoRMICK § 157; 1 UNDERHILL, CRnmNAL EVIDENCE §§ 205-12 (5th ed. 1956); 1 WIGMORE §§
192-94. See generally Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not
Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REV. 267 (1952); Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REv. 325 (1956); Stone, The

Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARv. L. REv.
954 (1933).
92. See 1

WIGMoRE § 57 at 455; Note, Other Crimes Evidence at
Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961).

93.

335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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effect it has on jurors "to so overpersuade them as to . . . deny
[the accused] a fair opportunity to defend against a particu...
' '94
charge.
lar
However, evidence of other crimes committed by the accused is admissible for some purposes. The prosecution may
introduce evidence of other crimes only if it is substantially relevant for some purpose other than to prove that the accused is a
man of criminal character 5 Thus, evidence of prior convictions
is admissible to prove that the accused has committed crimes
using a similar method of operation 6 The closer the identity
of the methods used, especially if the devices used are unique
and distinctive, the more probative the evidence is and the
more likely its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Similarly, in proving that the accused acted intentionally 0or7
with guilty knowledge, evidence of past crimes is admissible.
Here again the problem arises as to the proper utilization of
this evidence so that the defendant is not unduly prejudiced but
the state is able to use the evidence for its competent purpose
The resolution of this conflict has been to rely upon the limiting
instruction to prevent the jury from using other crimes' evidence
for a prohibited purpose.9 8 The probability that these instructions are heeded is very small.
A recent law review disclosed the results of tests confirming
the widely held view that the jury is unwilling to ignore this
evidence or limit its use to certain issues. 9 Consequently, other
94. Id. at 476. Michelson dealt with the procedure by which other
crimes' evidence may be introduced to the jury by way of cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses.
We do not overlook or minimize the consideration that "the jury
almost surely cannot comprehend the judge's limiting instruction," [see United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir.
1948) where the court of appeals suggests this problem]....
However, limiting instructions on this subject are no more difficult to comprehend or apply than those upon various other
subjects ....

Id. at 484-85. Accord, Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1965). See generally McCoimcx § 153; 3 WIGMORE § 988; 70 YALE L.J.
763, 779 (1961).

95. See Martin v. United States, 127 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928); McComcx §
157; 1 UNDImmL, CRImINAL EvDENc § 205 (5th ed. 1956); 1 WiGMoRE §
194.
96. McCoa.IcK § 157 at 328.
97. See generally McKusick, Techniques In Proof of Other Crimes
To Show Guilty Knowledge and Intent, 24 IowA L. REV. 471 (1939).
98. McCoRMvcK § 157; see Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C.

Cir. 1964).
99. See 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 n.89 (1961), citing material "generally unavailable."
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crimes' evidence must either be totally excluded, or admitted
with the understanding that the jury probably will not be able
to circumscribe its use of the evidence.
In several important areas, however, alternatives are available whereby reliance upon limiting instructions can be abandoned and the other crimes' evidence still used for its full probative value. Many states have habitual criminal statutes providing increased penalties for repeating felons. 00 Two basic
procedures have developed to implement these statutes: the
common law method, and the Connecticut procedure.
Under the common law method the entire indictment, including the allegations of the previous crimes,' 0 ' is read to the
jury, and during the state's case documentary evidence is introduced to substantiate the previous crimes. Although the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction, the evidence of past
crimes is before the jury when it determines guilt or innocence.
The Connecticut method,'0 2 on the other hand, avoids the needless prejudice of the common law method by postponing the introduction of prior crimes' evidence until a full trial is held upon
the primary question of guilt. 0 3 Only if the accused is convicted of the particular crime will the jury be permitted to hear
such evidence.10 4 While many states follow the common law
method, other states have judicially or legislatively changed
their procedures in view of its patent unfairness. 0 5
100. See 2 WHARTON, CRIVINAL EVIDENCE § 645 (12th ed. 1956).
Some typical state statutes are: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1649 (1956);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-1 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-7
(Smith-Hurd 1964); AID. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 300 (1957); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.155 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2802 (1955); TEXAs PEN. CODE art.
63 (1948) (Texas criminal procedure article 642 authorizes the prosecuting attorney to read the full indictment to the jury at the beginning of
the trial); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-9 (1957).
101. See Harrison v. State, 394 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1965); 33 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 210, 211 (1958).
102. See State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452 (1921).
103. Ibid.; see Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179,
183 (4th Cir. 1963); Harrison v. State, 394 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tenn. 1965);
33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 210, 216 (1958).
104. Harrison v. State, supra note 103, at 714.
105. See Robertson v. State, 29 Ala. App. 399, 197 So. 73 (1940);
Heinze v. People, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596 (1953); McWharter v. State,
118 Ga. 55, 44 S.E. 873 (1903); Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim.
1962); McCallister v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 844, 161 S.E. 67 (1931);
State v. Kirkpatrick, 181 Wash. 313, 43 P.2d 44 (1935); MD. R. PROC.
713, at 269-70 (1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-19 (1953); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6131 (1961).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla.
Crim. 1962), acted in a unique manner. The court had previously up-
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In Harrison v. State,1 06 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
reversed defendant's conviction of armed robbery and of being a
habitual criminal on the ground that "it is prejudicial error to
allow... evidence of [defendant's] previous convictions ... to
be placed before the jury prior to their determination of defendant's guilt or innocence of [the charge of armed robbery]
....

2"107

The court reasoned that limiting instructions were in-

capable of preventing prejudice:
There are limits to the human mind.

We think to say to any

jury, there is evidence here the defendant .. .has been guilty
of several prior crimes but you are not to consider this in determining his guilt or innocence of the present crime, is at best to
severely test the ability of the mind to remove all prejudice
therefrom. 08
In Lane v. Warden,10 9 the Fourth Circuit, on a habeas corpus
petition, reversed defendant's conviction on ' the ground that it
was impossible for the jury to separate the evidence as to guilt
and enhancement of punishment. The court did not directly deal
with the issue of whether limiting instructions were effective.
However, the court had little faith in their effectiveness, for the
trial court did so instruct the jury and had the instructions
been effective there would have been no prejudicial error. The
more probable explanation is an implicit recognition by the court
that these instructions are entirely worthless.
In a related area, however, the Third Circuit was not hesitant to dispute the effectiveness of limiting instructions. In
United States v. Banmiller,1 0 the court of appeals considered
the constitutionality of a statutory procedure known as the
"Parker Rule," whereby evidence of defendant's past criminal
convictions is admitted during trial to enable the jury to determine the penalty upon a finding of guilt. The trial court admonished the jury to consider the prior crimes evidence only as an
aid to sentencing. The court of appeals, however, commented
that:
[W]e cannot believe that ... the "Parker Rule" would permit
the jurors to put the knowledge of Scoleri's ... convictions...
held this procedure suggesting that the legislature should change it. In
Harris, the court reconsidered the practice and changed it to conform
with the Connecticut procedure, explaining that the failure of the legislature to act did not reflect its hostility toward this practice but only
an inability to grasp the meaning of the problem.
106.

394 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1965).

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 717.
Ibid.
320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
310 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1962).
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out of their minds while considering his guilt or innocence.
Certainly such a feat of psychological wizardry verges on the
impossible even for berobed judges. It is not reasonable to
suppose that it could have been accomplished by twelve laymen
brought together as a jury."'l
All jurisdictions recognize that other crimes' evidence is extremely prejudicial and only when its probative need is great,
and limiting instructions are used, is it admitted. 112 However,
if limiting instructions are not effective, little protection is given
the defendant. Again, the courts have considered the availability
of alternative procedures whereby the evidence may be presented without affecting the jury's determination of guilt or innocence.
The sixth amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy
Furtherthe right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . . ,1
more, the fourteenth amendment guarantees to the criminal defendant a fair trial by indifferent jurors, the failure to accord4
same violating even the minimal standards of due process."1
The terms "impartial jury" and "fair and impartial trial" are
used somewhat interchangeably 115 and necessarily overlap, since
a fair and impartial trial is impossible without an impartial jury.
The constitutional problems raised by this interrelationship are
(1) Whether the impartial jury requirement of the sixth amendment prohibits the use of evidence of prior crimes to enhance
punishment prior to the jury's determination of guilt or innocence, and if so, (2) whether this provision is of such a fundamental nature that it would be made obligatory on the states
through the fourteenth amendment; if either (1) or (2) is answered in the negative, (3) whether the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment prohibits this practice because the
prejudice to the defendant creates an unfair trial.
The sixth amendment contains no definite criteria for determining what constitutes an impartial jury. Consequently, the
111.

Id. at 725.

112. See McCoamiCK § 157 at 328-33; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777
(1961).
113. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. The Constitution does not demand that
the state provide criminal defendants with trial by jury. However, when
a jury is provided, it must be fair and impartial. Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
114. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927).
115. See Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 681 (1942): "The denial of a fair and impartial trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment ... ." Id. at 781. Here, the court assumed
that a partial jury creates an unfair trial.
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Supreme Court, in United States v. Wood,"" defined this term
in its broadest sense:
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude .. .the
is not
Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure
7
chained to any ancient and artificial formula."1
Several state courts have been more specific in their application
of this clause holding that an impartial jury "is one which is of
impartial frame of mind at the beginning of trial, is influenced
only by legal and competent evidence produced during trial, and
bases its verdict upon evidence connecting the defendant with
the commission of the crime charged .... ,"11 This definition
has never been accepted by the Supreme Court, and moreover,
the Court has never interpreted the sixth amendment to apply
to evidentiary practices which might prejudicially influence jurors. However, the Court has left a great deal of room for
interpretation of this amendment. It would seem that the Constitution requires that a juror remain in such a mental state
that no matter what a man has done in the past, there would be
a fair opportunity to prove his innocence of the crime with which
he is presently charged. This is very difficult when jurors are
informed of prior convictions, and it certainly would not be
stretching the meaning of the term "impartial" to preclude the
introduction of other crimes' evidence prior to a finding of
guilt or innocence. 1 9
Assuming that the Court would find the introduction of
other crimes' evidence violative of the sixth amendment, there
would be little to prevent it from making this provision obliga116.

299 U.S. 123 (1936).

117. Id. at 145-46. Accord, Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162
(1950); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); Baker v. Hudspeth,
129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1942).

118. People v. DeHaven, 321 Mich. 327, 334, 32 N.W.2d 468, 471 (1948.);
accord, People v. Lashkowitz, 166 Misc. 640, 3 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Sullivan
County Ct. 1938).
119. The effect of this evidence is obviously to create a partial jury,
yet whether this would be held within the sixth amendment requirement
is difficult to predict. Although the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider the constitutional objection of other crimes' evidence
under the sixth amendment, it has recently granted certiorari and heard
argument in several cases posing these issues. See Reed v. Beto, 343
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966)

(No. 268

Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 79, 1966 Term); Spencer v. Texas,
389 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 1022
(1966) (No. 273 Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 68, 1966 Term); Bell
v. Texas, 387 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1965), cert. granted, 382

U.S. 1023 (1966)
Term).

(No. 128 Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 69, 1966
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tory on the states. In Gideon v. Wainright120 and Pointer v.
Texas,121 the sixth amendment right to counsel and right to
confrontation were incorporated into the fourteenth amend,,122
ment as rights "fundamental and essential to a fair trial ....
the
arguto
adopt
Undoubtedly if the Court could be persuaded
ment that the introduction of other crimes' evidence prior to
guilt was violative of the impartial jury requirement of the
sixth amendment, it would apply it to the states.
Much of the above analysis is also applicable to the fourteenth amendment's due process clause requiring "fair and impartial trial." If the Court would be unwilling to recognize the
applicability of the sixth amendment, the minimal standards 1of
23
the due process clause also pose a challenge to this evidence.
The distinction has been pointed out above between the
many ways in which other crimes' evidence is used, in that in
certain circumstances an alternative method is available whereby prejudice easily can be avoided. There is little doubt that
this factor has been important in many constitutional determinations of due process.124

It would seem that the due process

argument would be more appealing to the Supreme Court since
it is intuitively unfair to subject a defendant to unnecessary
prejudice in view of a procedure which would accommodate both
parties without undue prejudice to either.
In Lane v. Warden, the court of appeals held that the Maryland habitual criminal procedure was unconstitutional because
it "destroyed the impartiality of the jury and denied .

defendant] due process of law."'

25

.

. [the

The court concluded that:

[O]f special significance in this case, [is] the revelation of
Lane's prior convictions to the jury prior to a finding of guilt
on the current charges was entirely unnecessary. Alternative
procedures ... were well known .... 126

Again, in Banmiller, the Third Circuit displayed its distrust of
the jury's ability to follow the limiting instruction holding that
"[the defendant] was overreached by the procedure followed at
120. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
121. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

122. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
123. Cases now before the Court argue due process.
124. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).

Here the Court noted that "reasonable and adequate alternatives are
available" to accomplish the city's motive in inspecting distant milk
sources.

125. Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179, 187 (4th
Cir. 1963).
126. Id. at 186.
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his trial" which was "so fundamentally unjust" as to deprive
him of due process under the fourteenth amendment. 12 7 Although the court did not specifically advert to the availability
of alternative procedures, it must have had this in mind since
the practice of having the jury determine the penalty does not
in any way conflict with the Constitution. Therefore, it must
be concluded that the presentation to the jury of other crimes'
evidence before the determination of guilt or innocence created
the constitutional objection, and that presumably, if limiting instructions had been effective or if such evidence had been given
to the jury after this determination, there would have been no
constitutional problem.
IV. MULTIPLE ADMISSIBILITY-LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS WHERE NO ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE
IS AVAILABLE
Throughout this Note, attention has been directed primarily
to the effect of a recognition that limiting instructions are
valueless in two areas where feasible alternatives are available.
In joint trials, excision and severance provide methods by which
prejudice can be cured with little or no administrative or tactical
burden upon the state.
n trials requiring a consideration of
prior offenses to enhance the punishment or to aid the jury in
sentencing, a separate hearing could be used subsequent to the
determination of guilt. The constitutional problems raised in
those situations resulted from the prejudice to the accused because of the ineffectiveness of the limiting instruction and the
fact that the prejudice could be easily eliminated. The remainder of this Note will deal with the result of a finding that
limiting instructions are ineffective in areas of multiple admissibility where no alternative procedure is available.
Where the same evidence, relevant to more than one issue
but not competent with respect to all, is presented to the jury, a
greater need arises to rely upon limiting instructions. The only
other choices are the naked admission of the evidence or its
total exclusion, neither of which is desirable. 128 There seem to
be two feasible approaches to this problem. First, a re-evaluation of the limiting instruction, and second, a re-evaluation of the
127. 310 F.2d 720, 725 (3rd Cir. 1962). Subsequent cases are awaiting determination by the Supreme Court on this issue. See note 119
supra.
128. As suggested by the Chicago jury project, no instruction at all
might be better. See 24 U. CH. L. Rav. 710, 713 (1957).
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evidence with emphasis on the ineffectiveness of the limiting
instruction.
It must be recognized that a jury is in many cases totally
unable to comprehend and follow the exclusionary rules reflected in limiting instructions. However, since experience is the
cornerstone of the rules of evidence, 129 it is possible that in certain situations jurors can sufficiently understand the need for a
limited consideration of evidence to enable them to discriminate.
The inability of the juror to follow a limiting instruction stems
from two factors: (1) the failure of most courts to adequately
and comprehensively explain the underlying need for the limitation on the evidence, and (2) the inherent psychological inability of the jury to disregard evidence.
Courts generally are too technical and superficial in their
instructions to the jury. Thus, the suggested jury instruction
in the federal courts for the admissibility of incriminating statements reads: "an admission or incriminatory statements made
outside of court by one defendant may not be considered as evidence against another defendant not present when the statement was made."' 30 The ineffectiveness of such an instruction
to a jury is obvious; it gives them no reason to do what they
intuitively would not do-limit their consideration of probative
evidence.
As discussed above, 131 the Supreme Court in Delli Paoli
felt that the instruction given by the trial court was sufficient
to enable the jurors to limit their consideration of the incriminatory confession to the defendant who made it. The trial
court attempted to explain to the jury the reason it should
limit consideration of this evidence:
An admission by defendant after his arrest ... may be considered as evidence by the jury against him ..

. because it is, as

the law describes it, an admission against interest which a person ordinarily would not make. However, if such defendant
...implicates other defendants in such an admission it is not
as to them it is nothevidence against those defendants3 because
2
ing more than hearsay evidence.1
The first part of the instruction might well tell a jury why the
evidence is admissible against the declarant, for experience
teaches that people do not generally, when encountered by the
129. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE Ox EVIDENCE
LAW, 263 (1898).

AT THE

Convlox

130. Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal
Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39, 63 (1960).
131. See note 29 supra.
132. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 240 (1957).
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police, admit things contrary to their best interest.13 3 However,
the crucial part of the instruction, explaining to the jury why it
must refrain from using the evidence against the other defendants, speaks only in terms of "hearsay evidence," not explaining
why the law has historically been distrustful of this evidence.
Thus, although the alternative of excision or severance would
have been much preferable, it would seem that a more explicit
and illuminating instruction might have given the jury a relatively better chance of performing the function required of it.
Given an instruction which would simply and comprehensively relay to the jury the common sense reasons for the distrust of hearsay evidence, the jury may be able to limit its
consideration of the evidence or, at least, give it less weight.
In many instances hearsay is admitted not to establish the
truth of the statement offered but as proof of some other issue.
In United States v. Kennedy, 3 4 defendant was charged with obstructing interstate commerce by extorting payments from interstate truck drivers. One of the elements of the case which had
to be proved was that the payments were made under duress.
Evidence was admitted consisting of testimony by the victimized truck drivers that they had been warned by other drivers
that nonpayment of the required fee would lead to beatings.
Since the men actually beaten did not testify, this evidence was
hearsay as to the truth of the beatings, but was admitted in this
case with an instruction limiting its use to prove the state of
mind of the victim and not the actual occurrence of the beatings.
The jurors probably would not be able to completely disregard the suggestion that other beatings had taken place, although arguably this would be an easier function for the jury to
perform than disregarding incriminating testimony in joint trials.
Yet, the jury might well believe that the victim had heard of
these beatings and thus was coerced to make the payments to
the defendants without considering whether the beatings had
actually taken place. Therefore, since the only alternative is
exclusion of this much needed evidence, the law could trust a
well-explained instruction in such an instance.
In contrast to Kennedy are the cases in which it would be
psychologically impossible for a juror to be instructed sufficiently to enable him to limit consideration of the prejudicial
evidence. This would seem to be the case when the judge instructs a jury to limit its use of other crimes' evidence. The
133.
134.

See note 41 supra.
291F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1961).
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difficulty in explaining to a jury that it should consider this
evidence only for a limited purpose is apparent.
The most plausible conclusion regarding the effectiveness of
limiting instructions is that in some instances the jury may
limit the weight given the prohibited element of the evidence.
However, in a criminal trial the consequences are too great to
attempt to resolve doubts as to the utility of the instruction
when the alternatives of severance or excision are available.
In cases where the only alternative is absolute exclusion,
discretion should remain in the trial court to closely examine
the protective value of the limiting instruction in the particular
case. This should be one of the factors weighed in balancing
the probative need for the evidence against its prejudicial effect.
This discretion would be reviewed by appellate courts, and presumably rules would evolve applicable to different situations of
multiple admissibility, all of which would be subject to the constitutional safeguards of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
V. CONCLUSION
The specific problems raised by this Note represent a sample
of the possible questions resulting from a conclusion that limiting instructions are ineffective in curing prejudice from incompetent evidence. In recognizing that these instructions are not
effective, the narrow issue left to consider is whether the particular evidence involved is admissible absent a limiting instruction. It is suggested that, since for many years this question has
been precluded from examination by the belief that these instructions performed their supposed function, the role of the law
is now one of reappraisal. In most instances such a re-examination must be made in light of the constitutional requirements
of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
Very likely Pointer and Jackson have created a new law of
joint trial procedure, focusing on the cross-examination requirement of the sixth amendment. In addition, Banmifler and Lane,
in conjunction with Jackson, would seem to create a constitutional rule, under the fourteenth amendment, requiring separate
hearings when possible in cases involving the admission of other
crimes' evidence. In both of these areas, a constitutional standard is needed to prevent the unnecessary prejudice to criminal
defendants in the face of available procedures which could easily
eliminate this prejudice with no significant burden on the law
enforcement process.
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The most troublesome questions arise where no alternative
procedures are available so that probative evidence must be
totally excluded if limiting instructions do not work. Probably,
full exclusion of the evidence, guarded in the past by limiting
instructions, is not called for. A re-evaluation of the evidence
must, however, be made in which the possible effectiveness of
the limiting instruction, the probative value of the evidence, and
its need would be the criteria in applying exclusionary practices.
Whatever result the courts reach with respect to the multiple admissibility of evidence, it must be considered a step forward when a profession so dedicated to the truth strives to
strike another deception from its midst.

